Pierce & Mandell, P.C.

11 Beacon Street, Suite 800
Boston, Massachusetts 02108-3002

Phone: (617) 720-2444
Fax: (617) 720-3693

Insurance Defense and Litigation

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Monday, January 11, 2016

On January 8, 2016, an Essex County (Newburyport)  jury returned a defense verdict in favor of Pierce & Mandell’s client on plaintiff’s significant personal injury claim.  Bob Pierce tried the case, and Scott Zanolli assisted.

The plaintiff in the case claimed that she fell on the walkway of a condominium complex due to untreated snow and ice.   Plaintiff brought claims against the condominium trust, the condominium manager, and Pierce & Mandell’s client, the snow removal contractor.  The plaintiff claimed that she suffered a herniated disc in her back as a result of the fall.  She underwent surgery about one month after the accident, and the surgery was allegedly botched, causing the plaintiff to suffer a torn aortic artery.   The plaintiff was airlifted to Mass General Hospital, where she underwent emergency life-saving surgery.

Under Massachusetts law, a defendant is liable for all foreseeable consequences of its negligence, including a surgeon’s malpractice.   Thus, if the plaintiff succeeded at trial, Pierce & Mandell’s client would have been liable for not only the herniated disc, but the injuries arising out of the claimed medical malpractice.   The plaintiff’s medical bills approached $400,000, and the plaintiff was permanently disabled after the accident.  Plaintiff’s initial demand for settlement was $5 Million.

On the first day of trial, Bob Pierce convinced the court that the liability aspects of the trial should be bifurcated from the damages portion of the case.  This ruling prohibited the plaintiff from offering evidence of her significant injuries during the liability trial.

After a several day trial on liability, the jury ruled that Pierce & Mandell’s client was not negligent, resulting in a  complete victory for Pierce & Mandell and its client.

Bob Pierce has now achieved complete victories for his clients in his last 6 jury trials.   Overall, Bob has achieved complete victory for his clients in over 85% of the cases he has tried to conclusion.

Available Recoverable Damages In Wrongful Death Actions - Boston, MA

Friday, December 04, 2015

By: Scott M. Zanolli

In wrongful death cases, estates of the deceased are entitled to specific statutory damages.  Under Massachusetts law, these damages are governed by G.L. c. 229, §2.  A claim for wrongful death is enforced by the personal representative of the decedent’s estate for the benefit of the statutory beneficiaries.  Under G.L. c. 229, §1, the beneficiaries of the decedent’s estate entitled to recovery are the surviving spouse, children of the deceased, and, if neither of those apply, the next of kin.

These individuals may recover the fair monetary value for: (i) the loss of reasonably expected net income, (ii) “consortium-like damages,” i.e., loss of protection, care, assistance, society, companionship, comfort, guidance, counsel, and advice, (iii) conscious pain and suffering, and (iv) reasonable funeral expenses.  Punitive damages of no less than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) may be awarded when the decedent’s death was caused by malicious, willful, wanton or reckless conduct, or by gross negligence.

Loss of Reasonably Expected Net Income

Determination of the amount of lost income damages is largely dependent on probabilities, and many factors will be taken into account by a court or jury, Lane v. Meserve, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 659, 667 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985), including the life expectancy of both the decedent and the beneficiaries, and the future prospects of the decedent.  The award is generally equal to the amount of net income that the decedent would reasonably have been expected to contribute to the beneficiaries.

Funeral Expenses

The estate of the deceased is entitled to recover funeral expenses.  The portion of the statute relating to funeral expenses does not refer to beneficiaries because funeral expenses become debts of the decedent's estate. Burt v. Meyer, 400 Mass. 185, 186 (1987).

“Consortium-like” Damages, i.e., loss of protection, care, assistance, society, companionship, comfort, guidance, counsel, and advice

Massachusetts does not recognize a separate cause of action for loss of consortium for family members in wrongful death cases.  However, the administrator of the estate of the deceased may bring suit for recovery for loss of consortium under the wrongful death statute, Litif v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D. Mass. 2010), and the statute contemplates recovery for both spousal companionship and loss of consortium for the child of a deceased parent. Doyon v. Travelers Indem. Co., 22 Mass. App. Ct. 336 (1986).

Conscious Pain and Suffering

General Laws c. 229, § 6 permits recovery for the decedent's conscious pain and suffering between the time of the injury and the time of the death.  Recovery is made on behalf of the estate and is divided among the surviving beneficiaries under the terms of the decedent's will, or the law of intestate succession if there is no will.  The term "conscious" is not meant to be interpreted “with the refinements one expects to find in a study of the elusive subject of consciousness,” but rather, the conscious suffering shown by proof beyond mere conjecture. Or v. Edwards, 62 Mass App 475 (2004).  A potential subset of conscious pain and suffering is recovery for fear of impending or imminent death.  This is an unsettled area of law in Massachusetts, but has been recognized in other jurisdictions under certain circumstances, most notably in aviation accidents.

Punitive Damages

Punitive damages are available under the wrongful death statute in circumstances where death was caused by the malicious, willful, wanton or reckless conduct, or by the gross negligence of the defendant.  This category of damages is designed to punish the defendant, not to make the plaintiff whole. Burt v. Meyer, 400 Mass. 185 (1987).  Under this portion of the statute, the negligence of the deceased is not to be taken into account. Lane v. Meserve, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 659 (1985).

Damages in wrongful death cases are extremely complex to evaluate and estimate.  This is due in part to the fact that consortium type damages are wholly subjective, and thus their quantification can vary widely from juror to juror.  Also, determinations related to conscious pain and suffering are muddled in instances where the decedent died instantly, but suffered from an obvious fear of impending death.  Pierce & Mandell has considerable experience handling complex insurance defense, as well as wrongful death litigation, and can assist anyone involved in this type of case.


Wednesday, November 18, 2015

By Curtis B. Dooling

On New Year’s Eve 2014, an UberX driver in San Francisco struck a family crossing the street and killed a six year-old girl. This was the first – but likely not the last - tragic motor vehicle accident involving vehicles driven by Uber drivers or other ride-share companies.

What propelled this story after the tragedy was a wrongful death claim filed by the family of the little girl against Uber, which denied liability on the basis that while the UberX driver was available to pick up passengers, there were no passengers in the car at the time of the accident. If the regulatory scheme for ride-share companies is complex, the issue of liability is no less complicated.

Under the Massachusetts personal automobile insurance policy, all vehicles are required to carry bodily injury coverage of $20,000 per person and $40,000 per accident, with the option to purchase additional bodily injury coverage over the compulsory limits. This compulsory coverage is available only to individuals who are not occupants of the insured vehicle. Many ride-share drivers use their own personal vehicles when driving ride-share passengers, but don’t disclose their activities to their respective insurers. When insurers learn of this, usually after an accident, the insurer will disclaim all optional coverage, leaving only compulsory coverage available to all non-occupants of the insured vehicle. Thus, often times there is no coverage available under the driver’s auto policy for ride-share passengers injured during a ride-share trip.

According to Uber’s website, from the moment a driver accepts a trip request until that trip ends, Uber provides $1 million in liability coverage, including uninsured and underinsured coverage. This coverage is available to injured ride-share passengers, other drivers, and pedestrians, as long as the ride-share app is on and the driver has passengers. To the contrary, most taxi companies normally only carry the minimum in bodily injury coverage ($20,000 per person/$40,000 per accident). Therefore, Uber’s $1 million in liability coverage is significantly better than the average taxi’s insurance coverage.

However, there is a ride-share insurance gap. When an Uber driver has the ride-share app on but doesn’t have any passengers, does Uber’s $1 million insurance provide coverage? This issue first came to light after the tragic accident in San Francisco. The family of the six year-old girl filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Uber, which denied liability on the basis that the UberX driver, although available, didn’t have any passengers at the time of the accident. After much public outcry and criticism, Uber changed its policy to eliminate this insurance gap uncertainty. Since that time, Uber claims that its drivers are covered by bodily injury coverage from the moment that a driver turns on the app and is available for a trip request. However, the limits of coverage aren’t the same. If an Uber driver is available but has no passengers and hasn’t accepted a job, Uber provides $50,000 person/$100,000 per accident in coverage. Once a driver accepts a job, the $1 million in coverage becomes available.

Governor Charlie Baker is now weighing in on this topic with legislation that would create statutory standards to govern ride-share companies (referred to as Transportation Network Companies or TNCs). The proposed law would require that all TNC drivers carry the standard minimum automobile bodily injury coverage, effective when a TNC driver is available but before accepting a trip request. Upon accepting a trip request, a TNC driver then would be required to carry $1 million in liability insurance. The bill would bring all TNCs within the regulatory authority of the Commonwealth, and would subject TNC drivers to more stringent background and eligibility requirements. The proposed legislation has been vehemently opposed by the taxi industry, which argues that ride-share companies should be subject to the same regulation as the taxi industry.

As the popularity of Uber and other similar companies increases, regulators and lawmakers are responding with changes in the law that will affect liability coverage for ride-share companies, drivers, riders and those who may become involved in an accident with an Uber-driven vehicle. Pierce & Mandell’s attorneys have years of experience in all areas of insurance litigation and personal injury litigation.

Massachusetts Appeals Court Extends Workers’ Compensation Bar to “Alternate Employers”

Friday, November 06, 2015

by Paul Hourihan, Pierce & Mandell, P.C.

The Massachusetts Appeals Court recently extended the bar on liability provided in the Massachusetts Workers’ Compensation Act, G.L. c. 152, § 1, et seq., to protect employers whose employees are provided by a separate staffing entity. The Massachusetts Workers’ Compensation statute requires employers to obtain workers’ compensation insurance for all employees to ensure that employees injured during the course of their employment will be adequately and expeditiously compensated.  The statute also provides that, on the other hand, workers injured on the job cannot sue their employer for negligently causing the accident.

This statute has created a bit of an ambiguity in the context of the temporary workers provided by staffing companies. When a company needs extra manpower (or womanpower), and contracts with a staffing company for temporary employees, nothing in the Workers’ Compensation Act prevents an injured temporary employee from suing the temporary employer, regardless of coverage under an insurance policy.

The Massachusetts Appeals Court, in Molina v. State Garden, Inc., 88 Mass. App. Ct. 173 (Sept. 3, 2015) recently ruled that the Workers’ Compensation Act will serve to bar the claims of an injured employee against a temporary employer when (1) the temporary employer works at the direction of the temporary employer and (2) the temporary employer is afforded workers’ compensation insurance coverage under an “alternate employer endorsement” of the staffing company’s insurance policy. The “alternative employer endorsement” of the policy will serve to cover a temporary employee’s accident and will provide the temporary employer the protections of the Workers’ Compensation Act.

This ruling serves as an exhortation to any employers who contract for employees from staffing companies: insist that any staffing company provide an “alternate employer endorsement” naming your company as an alternate employer. Doing so will protect your temporary employees and will protect your company from lawsuits.

Paul Hourihan is an associate at Pierce & Mandell who handles claims for workplace accidents and injuries.

Trip and Fall Suit Against Retail Store Dismissed on Summary Judgment - Boston, MA

Friday, October 02, 2015

By: Curtis B. Dooling

A superior court judge recently dismissed a plaintiff’s trip and fall claim against Ward’s Berry Farm in Sharon, MA, holding that a pallet with a box of empty fruit baskets on it next to a checkout counter was not an unreasonable danger that required the store to warn customers.

In the case, Belanger v. Boys in Berries, LLC, the plaintiff was at a checkout counter at Ward’s Berry Farm, a pick your own fruit farm stand. While in the checkout line, the plaintiff saw a large box that contained a number of empty fruit baskets used to pick your own fruit. The plaintiff didn’t notice that the baskets sat on a wooden pallet. As the plaintiff walked away from the checkout counter, she tripped and fell over a corner of the wooden pallet.

The plaintiff claimed that the placement of the pallet directly adjacent to the checkout counter was dangerous and that the store breached its duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. The court disagreed. The court found that placing the pallet at the end of the checkout counter in full view of customers was “fully consistent” with a store’s duty to maintain its premises in a safe condition. The court relied on two Supreme Judicial Court cases which held that customers in supermarkets could not sue for tripping over stock carts or shopping carts in aisles. The court held that a pallet near a checkout counter was just as ubiquitous as a shopping cart in a supermarket aisle and was not an unreasonably dangerous condition.

The ruling is a victory for property owners. The ruling confirms that it is insufficient for a plaintiff simply to show that she tripped over an item in a retail store. To the contrary, a plaintiff must show that she tripped because of a retail store’s failure to remedy a dangerous condition. Having a pallet with boxes on it is quite common in retail stores. In this case there was no evidence of poor lighting or damage to the wooden pallet or any other indicia that the pallet or its location in the store was dangerous.

All too often property owners and insurers are willing to settle trip and fall claims rather than litigate the cases and seek summary judgment. Pierce & Mandell’s litigation attorneys regularly represent small businesses and property owners and are uniquely qualified to aggressively defend any slip and fall claim.

“Hereof fail not…” – The SJC’s Recent Change to Mass. Subpoena Procedure

Wednesday, July 15, 2015

by Paul Hourihan, Associate, Pierce & Mandell, P.C.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently amended Rule 45 of the Mass. Rules of Civil Procedure to include language authorizing “documents only subpoenas.”  Prior to this change, subpoenas in Massachusetts were deposition subpoenas: attorneys, even if they didn’t want to talk to you, would send you a subpoena that made it look like they wanted to sit down and talk to you, when all they really wanted was your documents.  (This is called a deposition subpoena duces tecum, Latin for “you will bring with you…”).

The change undoubtedly clarifies a heretofore ambiguous procedure, and may help settle the question of “do they really want me (or my client) to show up, or do they just want documents?”  What remains to be seen is if this will cause a spike in subpoena non-compliance.  A subpoena is easier to ignore if you are not being compelled to actually show up at a certain place and time. With the threat of schedule disruption having been removed, to ensure compliance, attorneys will have to rely on official-looking notary seals and that omnipresent, intimidating, inscrutable subpoena sign-off, “Hereof fail not as you will answer your default under the pain and penalties in the law in that behalf made and provided.”

In the health care field, the rule change does not eliminate the need of health care providers to serve an objection letter if the subpoena is served without a signed patient specific authorization when (1) the records sought are hospital or clinical records and the records include protected information or (2) the records sought contain non-facility practitioner/practice health information of any kind.

Pierce & Mandell, P.C. has extensive experience in the field of subpoena compliance, navigating the confidentiality and privilege pitfalls of subpoena responses for individuals, health care providers, and corporations of all types and sizes.

Pro Hac Vice Counsel; Only as Good As Their Local Counsel

Thursday, March 26, 2015

By: Dennis Lindren

Pursuant to G.L. c. 221, §46A, out of state counsel may seek permission to practice law temporarily in Massachusetts pro hac vice.   While the provisions of that particular statute clearly allow the Court wide discretion in deciding a pro hac vice motions (see e.g. Diluzio v. United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, Local 274, et al., 391 Mass. 211 (1984), in practice, opposing counsel rarely oppose, and the Courts routinely grant, pro hac vice motions to out of state counsel who satisfy the requirements of the statute.  The operative question then is not whether out of state counsel can represent their clients in Massachusetts Courts, but whether the best interests of the client are advanced by doing so.

To even the most experienced out of state lawyer, the legal landscape in Massachusetts can be confusing, if not somewhat intimidating.  From the unique procedural requirements of Superior Court Rule 9A, to the considerable remedies (in theory) allowed pursuant to the Massachusetts Consumer Protection statute, G.L. c. 93A, developing a basic understanding of Massachusetts law in any given practice area is no small task.  In addition, there are very important cultural, economic and geographic considerations unique to Massachusetts to be taken into account in formulating litigation and trial strategy that the uninitiated lawyer may likely overlook to their client’s detriment.  In short and not surprisingly, there is a considerable home field advantage for the client who is represented by a Massachusetts attorney in a Massachusetts action.

Nevertheless and for a variety of reasons, it often makes sense (or the client simply prefers) that their out of state counsel seek to be admitted pro hac vice.   In such instances, the first and most critical step is to identify and retain experienced, local trial counsel.  Not only are local counsel required to enter an appearance in the matter and sponsor the pro hac vice motion, but much more importantly, when allowed, they act as procedural guides and local legal experts, invariably saving the client time and money in the prosecution or defense of their action.  At Pierce & Mandell, P.C., we are experienced trial lawyers who try cases.  We have broad experience trying the most sophisticated civil litigation matters.  We have worked with a variety of small, medium and large out of state firms, both as co-counsel and local counsel, in the prosecution and defense of civil actions here in the Commonwealth.  If your client is in need of Massachusetts counsel, or you are in need of local counsel to sponsor your pro hac vice motion, please contact Dennis Lindgren at (617) 720-2444.

Bob Pierce tells Boston Business Journal to Expect a Major Spike in Winter-Related Litigation - Boston, MA

Friday, March 06, 2015

Seasoned Pierce & Mandell litigator and founding partner Bob Pierce may not get his NCAA Final Four Championship bracket exactly right, but he was pretty confident when reached by The Boston Business Journal this week about the effect of this biblical winter on future litigation.  Unlike some past winters that were relatively mild with minimal snow and ice events, Pierce said that this year’s historic winter will inevitably lead to more litigation, predicting a 50 percent increase in winter related claims.

“By the summer we’ll see a spike in litigation,” the veteran attorney told the Boston Business Journal’s Greg Ryan, whose story describes this winter as ‘snowmaggedon.’

SJC Announces Interim Procedure for Attorney and Self-Represented Party Participation in Juror Voir Dire

Thursday, December 11, 2014

by Robert R. Pierce and Curtis B. Dooling

On December 5, 2014 the Massachusetts Superior Court issued a standing order outlining interim procedures governing attorney-conducted voir dire in Superior Court civil and criminal trials. The standing order was issued in anticipation of the implementation of G. L. c. 254, § 2, which will go into effect on February 2, 2015. Although trial judges will still have discretion as to how attorneys conduct voir dire, this Standing Order represents a significant change in Massachusetts trial practice. Massachusetts, unlike most states, has never before permitted attorneys to directly question jurors. Attorneys will now have an opportunity to pose questions directly to jurors in an effort to uncover biases and to learn more about the background of potential jurors.

The Standing Order dictates the specific procedures attorneys must follow to conduct voir dire. For example, attorneys will be required to seek approval from the court as to the topics of questions posed to potential jurors and, in some cases, will be required to seek court approval regarding the wording of questions. Attorneys will be required to comply with Superior Court Rule 9A when serving and filing motions to conduct voir dire. Thus, attorneys will need to consider voir dire questions well before trial begins.

The Standing Order provides the trial judge with wide discretion in determining which questions attorneys will be permitted to ask and the manner in which the questions will be asked. The Standing Order also outlines topics which will generally be allowed (background, experience, bias, ability to listen to judge’s instructions) and those topics which will be disfavored (political views, religious beliefs, hobbies, participation as a juror in other cases) unless a specific showing is made that the topics are germane to the case.

The Standing Order, which goes into effect on February 2, 2015, will likely be superseded by rules established by the Supreme Judicial Court. However, at this point it is unclear when the Supreme Judicial Court will issue final rules implementing G. L. c. 254, § 2. Thus, trial attorneys must familiarize themselves with the new Standing Order and must be prepared to seek court approval for voir dire questions in advance of trial.

Plaintiff’s attorneys, who strongly supported the passage of G. L. c. 254, § 2, may not be content with the amount of discretion that trial judges have to control the types of questions attorneys may ask jurors. The plaintiff’s bar will likely urge the Superior Court to modify the Standing Order to provide more latitude to trial attorneys in conducting voir dire.

For example, Pierce & Mandell attorneys Bob Pierce and Curt Dooling recently received a pre-trial request from a plaintiff’s attorney to ask potential jurors the following questions:

  • Do you believe that there are too many big verdicts and/or jury awards to injured persons in the Courts? How have you come to that belief?
  • Some people believe that you should not receive money damages for injuries or pain and suffering. Other people feel it is appropriate. Which one of those groups are you closer to?

Based on the Standing Order, a judge has discretion not to permit these types of questions to be asked by plaintiff’s attorneys because they delve too far into a juror’s political beliefs. Whereas the plaintiff’s bar views these biases as an impediment to a fair and impartial jury.

Changes to Voir Dire and Damages Requests

Tuesday, September 09, 2014

By: Robert Pierce and Natalia Smychkovich

        On August 6, 2014, Governor Patrick signed House Bill 4123, the “Trial Court Bill,” altering two Massachusetts statutes concerning trial procedure at the Superior Court level.  The new law, effective February, 2015, will substantially alter jury trial practice in two ways: first, attorneys will be permitted to question jurors during the impanelment process and second, counsel will be permitted to propose a specific dollar amount of damages to the jury during trial.

        Prior to the passage of this bill, Massachusetts remained the only state in New England, and one of the few states nationwide, that did not permit attorney-conducted voir dire.  Voir dire is the questioning of prospective jurors by a judge or attorneys in court prior to trial.

        Currently, the process of voir dire in Massachusetts is controlled by the judge in any given trial.  As a way of screening for bias, a basic questionnaire is provided to jurors before they appear for jury duty.  During impanelment, in a typical case, only the judge is permitted to ask the potential jurors any questions during the selection process.  Most judges are receptive to asking the panel or specific potential jurors questions that the attorneys want to be asked.

        The recently signed bill modifies the statute governing voir dire practices, M.G.L. c. 234, §28, in pertinent part, as follows:

(1)  In addition to whatever jury voir dire of the jury venire is conducted by the court, the court shall permit, upon the request of any party's attorney or a self-represented party, the party's attorney or self-represented party to conduct an oral examination of the prospective jurors at the discretion of the court.
 (2)  The court may impose reasonable limitations upon the questions and the time allowed during such examination, including, but not limited to, requiring pre-approval of the questions.

        Essentially, the procedure has been changed to allow attorneys the benefit of direct examination of potential jurors prior to selection.  The statute language is open-ended in a way that allows the courts to maintain reasonable control over the process.  The court policies, practices and procedures remain unclear at this time, and there will undoubtedly be a learning curve as the new practices are adopted.  Many questions are left to be answered:
  • Will attorneys be questioning the potential jurors individually at sidebar or as a group in open court?  
  • Will opposing counsel be afforded the opportunity to raise objections to certain questions?
  • Will the judge, as is the case in some states, leave the court room during voir dire?

        Approximately one week after the bill was signed, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court formed a committee to work with the Superior Court to develop procedures for the implementation of the new statute.

        Support for the new statute came primarily from the Massachusetts Bar Association and the Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys.  Recent studies have shown that Massachusetts has one of the lowest plaintiff personal injury win rates in the nation. Plaintiffs’ attorneys have voiced concerns that the public has grown suspicious of lawsuits due to a growing perception that many lawsuits are frivolous and unfounded, and that many potential jurors may be unintentionally biased against plaintiffs.  The plaintiffs’ bar and other supporters of the act hope that the new measure will provide attorneys and judges with more information about potential jurors, reducing prejudices and making Massachusetts a more plaintiff-friendly state.  On the other hand, as defense counsel, we will have an equal opportunity to expose “pro-plaintiff” jurors.

        Additional emphasis will now be placed on jury selection and more time will be spent writing effective voir dire questions.  Jury verdict research may be beneficial in helping attorneys utilize this new procedure in an efficient way.  In addition, Pierce & Mandell attorneys will be reaching out to fellow defense lawyers in other states to explore best practices for attorney-conducted voir dire.  While the bulk of cases will continue to resolve through summary judgment or settlement, the new voir dire procedure will certainly increase trial costs.


As part of the same bill, an amendment was made to M.G.L. c. 231, §13B. The following sentence has been added to the statute: “In civil actions in the superior court, parties, through their counsel, may suggest a specific monetary amount for damages at trial.”  Prior to this addition, the statute read,
No complaint in any civil action shall contain an ad damnum or monetary amount claimed against any defendant, unless such ad damnum or monetary amount claimed indicates damages which are liquidated or ascertainable by calculation and a statement under oath by a person having knowledge thereof is attached to such complaint setting forth the manner in which the amount of said damages was calculated. For the purposes of this section complaint shall include a claim, crossclaim or counterclaim.

Simply stated, in personal injury cases, juries were previously presented with monetary amounts for special damages such as medical expenses and lost earning capacity, but were left without guidance as to what amount (if any) should be awarded for intangible damages such as pain and suffering, loss of companionship, disfigurement, etc.  Typically, in their closing arguments, plaintiffs’ lawyers would specifically list the special damages, and then tell the jury that they should award a substantial amount for pain and suffering, and to use their common sense in arriving at an award

Several questions remain to be answered. First, to what extent will the plaintiffs’ bar overreach, meaning request an unreasonably high sum? Certainly, such a strategy could backfire on plaintiffs. In cases where the plaintiff prevails, will juries award the amount requested, or some lesser (or greater) amount?  Given the general sentiment regarding personal injury lawsuits in Massachusetts, juries very well may be aggravated by obviously inflated dollar amounts suggested by attorneys, possibly leading to lower awards for plaintiffs.

Also, it is unclear whether the amount plaintiffs are requesting will be disclosed in discovery, or at a minimum, prior to closing arguments.

While more emphasis will be placed on proving what amount of money intangible damages such as pain and suffering are worth, it is not generally our practice to counter amounts suggested by plaintiff’s counsel.  As a practical matter, for most of the cases that Pierce & Mandell tries, the focus of our defense is on liability rather than damages.  In other words, in a typical case, we are seeking a defense verdict rather than attempting to limit the damages award.  Of course, in a high exposure, likely liability case, more time would be spent on breaking down the plaintiff’s damages claims.

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